The Maastricht Treaty, concluded in 1992 between the twelve Member States of the European Communities, is the founding treaty of the European Union (EU). Formally, the Treaty on the European Union. it announced “a new stage in the process of European integration”, notably in the gates of a common European citizenship, the introduction of a single currency and (with less precision) for the common foreign and security policy. Although they were widely regarded as a harbinger of a `federal Europe`, the constitutional debate shifted to the future Lisbon Treaty of 2007. Following the debt crisis in the euro area, which began in 2009, the most enduring reference to the Maastricht Treaty was the rules of compliance – the “Maastricht criteria” – for monetary union. Below is a philosophical overview of the rule of law. We will then discuss the economic origin and the theory of political rules. Finally, we describe our rules-based paradigm before concluding. The institutional structure of EMU was defined in the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s.
In recent years, it has been strengthened by new rules such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the six-pack and the double pack, the European semester and the fiscal pact19. Title I, common provisions, establishes the European Union (EU) on the basis of the three European Communities already partially merged: the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). It confirms that one of its objectives is the joint introduction of EU citizenship for nationals of Member States; “Economic and monetary union, including, ultimately, a single currency”; and “a common foreign and security policy, including the final organisation of a common defence.”  TEN-T – The trans-European transport network (non-responsibility clause: under the withdrawal agreement, EU legislation applies to the UK and the UK until the end of the transition) The underlying elements of the German traditional political rules are a self-regulating mechanism and personal liability if the market fails or if production does not lead to the desired result. In the event of market failure, policy makers are called upon to create a market-based correction mechanism, which consists of policy rules. Therefore, the policy of the institutional order does not regulate the nudity of the regulatory policy. On the contrary, political rules are defined as rules of the game. In the area of fiscal and monetary policy, policy rules need to be more specific in order to limit the incentive of governments to exceed spending, in order to increase the likelihood of their re-election, i.e. the political budget cycle11. Frequent or sudden changes to the rules should be prohibited, unless they are for one-off events. 38 On the possible link between the liberalisation of financial markets and the need for more institutionalised coordination in the currency area, see Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, “Financial and Monetary Integration in Europe: 1990, 1992 and Beyond”, Group of Thirty Casual Documents, No. 28 (1990), and in particular p. 21 to 3.
As Mr Sandholtz points out, EC officials have repeatedly stressed the need to develop a path to EMU functionally; see Sandholtz, `Choosing Union`, pp.